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Tax. DeBlois v. Clark, 764 A.2d 727 (R.I. 2001). The appropriate
burden of proof for a determination of domicile in a state income
tax case is the preponderance of the evidence test as outlined in
section 8-8-25 of the Rhode Island General Laws.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
This is an appeal of a tax deficiency judgment at the district
court holding petitioner was a resident of Rhode Island and owed
Rhode Island income taxes.' In the district court the Department
of Revenue initially raised two arguments: first, the petitioner is a
domiciliary of Rhode Island, and second, the source of income rules
mandated the income be treated as Rhode Island income subject to
tax at a resident's rate.2 However, the argument regarding source
of income was not addressed in the district court's opinion.3
Petitioner was a resident of Rhode Island for many years. 4
However, in 1988 he decided to relocate to Florida.5 In the decision
making process the petitioner contacted a tax expert to determine
how to appropriately make Florida his permanent residence. 6 Pe-
titioner retained a condominium in Warren, as well as buying a
condominium in Florida.7 Petitioner spent late May to early Octo-
ber and late November and December in Rhode Island and the re-
maining months in Florida. The parties stipulated that the
petitioner spent less than 183 days in Rhode Island.8 While he
was not using the condominium in Rhode Island, other family
members, who were non-residents of Rhode Island, used it for a get
away location. 9 Family and business ties to Rhode Island re-
mained.' 0 However, petitioner did resign from several civic and
business groups explaining that he moved his residence to the
State of Florida." After filing non-resident income tax returns for
1. DeBlois v. Clark, 764 A.2d 727, 730 (R.I. 2001).
2. Id.
3. Id at 731 n.1.
4. Id. at 730.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 734.
7. Id. at 730.
8. Id. at 730 n.1.
9. Id. at 730.
10. Id. at 733.
11. Id. at 736.
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the years 1991, 1992 and 1993, petitioner received notices from the
tax assessor stating that the tax was due in 10 days.12
The tax division determined that the petitioner was a Rhode
Island resident, subject to the resident income taxes.13 The tax ad-
ministrator affirmed the hearing officer. 14 The district court held
utilizing the clear and convincing standard that the petitioner was
unsuccessful in changing his domicile and that the deficiency no-
tices were valid since any deficiencies were de minimis.' 5
The main issue is whether the domicile must be established by
a clear and convincing standard or by a preponderance of the evi-
dence standard. 16 The procedural issue is the validity of the defi-
ciency notices received. 17
BACKGROUND
A resident for state income tax purposes is defined in R.I. Gen-
eral Laws section 44-30-5(a) as either someone who is domiciled in
the state, or someone who is not domiciled in this state, that meets
the following conditions: they own a permanent residence in the
state and they are actually present in the state for more than 183
days.18
An additional method for the state to tax at resident rates, is
the source of income theory that is set forth in R.I. General Laws
section 44-30-32.19 However, this theory was not addressed in the
district court's opinion.20
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The supreme court held that the correct burden of proof is the
preponderance of evidence standard.2 ' Applying that standard,
the court found that the petitioner was successful in changing his
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 731.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 730.
17. Id.
18. The 183-day limit is not an issue in this case because the parties stipu-
lated that the petitioner was not located in the state for more than 183 days.
19. Id. at 731 n.1.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 730.
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domicile to the state of Florida.22 The court also held that the no-
tices of deficiencies received by the taxpayer were defective. 23
The court stated that R.I. General Laws section 8-8-28 governs
the burden of proof in tax cases.24 That statute states that a "pre-
ponderance of evidence shall suffice to sustain the burden of
proof".25 The statute goes on to say that if the issue is one of fraud,
then the standard is the clear and convincing standard. 26 The
court held that because the Department of Revenue did not assert
fraud, the petitioner needed only to show by a preponderance of the
evidence the change in domicile state. 27 The tax administrator ar-
gued that the statute allows both the burden of proof and the bur-
den of production to shift. 28 The court held that the burden of
proof lies with the party looking for affirmative relief.29 The court
went on to explain that the burden of production shifts as the case
proceeds in the same manner as any other civil suit.30 Once the
court decided the appropriate legal standard, it went on to resolve
the case, as all the facts were uncontroverted.3 ' To resolve the
case, the court needed to address the domicile of the petitioner and
the validity of the notices. 32
The court stated a person can have only one domicile, although
he can have several residences. 33 The court defined the test to
change a domicile, as consisting of two prongs. 34 The first prong
mandates that the person must have a physical abode in the new
location.35 The second prong requires that the person have the in-
tent to stay permanently in the new location. 36 The court held that
the petitioner was able to demonstrate both prongs of the above
test. The petitioner's ownership of the condominium in Florida
22, Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 731.
25. Id. at 732.
26. Id,
27. Id. at 732-33.
28. Id. at 732.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 733.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 733-38.
33. Id. at 734.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
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satisfied the first prong. 37 The second test must be determined on
a case-by-case basis.38 The district court relied heavily on the fact
that petitioner decided that their final resting-place would be in
Rhode Island.3 9 The supreme court stated that while this is a fac-
tor, it should be weighed lightly because there are many reasons a
person would choose a final resting-place. 40 Many of these reasons
do not reflect where the person is interested in remaining while
alive.41 The supreme court looked to the fact that the petitioner
told people that he was changing his domicile to the state of Flor-
ida when resigning from civic and business groups.42
The supreme court also looked at the location of household
items.43 The higher percentage of overall personal belongings in a
residence, the more of an indication it is of which location the peti-
tioner intended to be their domicile." In this case, the petitioner
had over three-quarters of his possessions in the state of Florida,
and had been granted a homestead exemption.45 Other factors the
court considered included: voter registrations intangible taxes,
driver's licenses, car registrations, churches, country club member-
ships and wills, which the petitioner had changed to Florida.4
The above factors caused the court to decide that the petitioner
had intended his domicile to be in the State of Florida, thus meet-
ing the second test.47 It is not required that the petitioner aban-
don the old location completely.48
The final issue raised in the case is the validity of the defi-
ciency notices.49 The petitioners received deficiency notices that
indicated "Federal Tax Liability Appears Incorrect Rhode Island
Tax Computed Incorrectly."50 The deficiency notice mandated that
37. Id. at 735.
38. Id. at 734.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 735.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 736.
43. Id. at 735.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 735-36.
46. Id. at 736.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 737.
49. Id. at 736.
50. Id.
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the tax was due within 10 days of the notice being mailed. 51 The
notices contained no other information. 52 If the deficiencies in the
notice do not comply with R.I. General Laws section 44-30-81 but
are de minimis, the notices can stand.53 However, if the deficien-
cies are not de minimis then the court has the right to void the
assessments. 54 The R.I. General Laws section 44-31-81(b) states
that the notice of deficiency will turn into an assessment after 30
days. 55 At that time the tax can be collected. 56 These notices con-
tradicted that statute by demanding payment in ten days, there-
fore the court held them to be invalid.57 The notices were also held
to be invalid because the reason for the deficiency was too vague
and possibly misleading. 58 From the notation on the deficiency,
the petitioner could not tell that the issue was one of residency. It
appeared to be that the Department of Revenue felt that the peti-
tioner had calculated his federal income tax incorrectly. 59 Since
Rhode Island income tax is based on the federal income tax, this
was a misleading comment.60 As such, this notice was held to be
invalid and the assessments were unlawful. 61
CONCLUSION
The supreme court held that the petitioner was successful in
changing his domicile, that the correct burden of proof is the pre-
ponderance of evidence standard and that the notice of deficiencies
received by the taxpayers were defective.
Marjorie A. Connelly
51. Id. at 737.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 737-38.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 738.
60. Id.
61. Id.
